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CONSTITUTIONALLY AUTONOMOUS HIGHER
EDUCATION GOVERNANCE: A PROPOSED
AMENDMENT TO THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION
JOSEPH BECKHAM*
INTRODUCTION

The statutory status of the Board of Regents of the State University System
of Florida presently permits unchecked interference in the affairs of the university system by external powers when legislative enactment explicitly or impliedly so authorizes. In addition to the legislature's power to direct university

system affairs, the State Board of Education and numerous other agencies of
state government may be statutorily authorized to exercise discretion with regard to matters of university governance. Thus, the legislature is constitutionally empowered to exercise potentially unlimited control over the university
system. Additionally, the legislature may transfer this power of control to other
state administrative bodies within broad constitutional limits.
In contrast to the system of higher education governance in Florida, other
state constitutions provide, through judicial interpretation, for an autonomous
public higher education system. Legal challenges to the constitutionallymandated higher education self-governance in these states have resulted in
findings that the state constitution confers a legal status on the governing
board equal to that of the legislature or the executive. Hence, constitutionally
autonomous state higher education systems are considered to be removed from

the direct and immediate control of the legislature and executive. However, in
Florida, which confers no constitutional status on the higher education system,
public higher education is continuously subject to legislative and executive
prerogative.
Clearly then, a constitutional provision granting exclusive control and
management of the State University System of Florida to the Board of Regents
would have significant consequences for Florida statutory law and for the
legally defined relationship between higher education and state offices and
agencies. This article will analyze the legal status of constitutionally autonomous higher education systems, propose a constitutional provision granting
autonomous status to Florida's Board of Regents, and assess the legal implication of adopting the constitutional provision granting autonomy.
RATIONALE FOR AUTONOMOUS CONTROL

Historically, American colleges and universities have been substantially independent from policy determination by external bureaucracy, yet the concern
*J.D. 1969, University of Florida, Holland Law Center; Ph.D. (educational administration)

1977, University of Florida; Assistant Professor, Graduate School of Education, University of
Pennsylvania.
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for maintaining that independence has intensified in this century. The
Carnegie Commission has noted,
Institutional independence never has been total, nor should it be.
Higher education also has never had less independence from public
control, in all of American history, than it now has. More institutions of
higher education are public than ever before. The great change of the
past decade was .

.

. the quiet increase in public power - by governors,

by legislators .... I
Preserving the independence of American higher education has received
strong positive emphasis in numerous reports by commissions studying higher
education in this century. In 1952, the Commission on Financing Higher Education produced a report that emphasized the need to maintain diverse institutional forms of higher education in order to insure institutional independence.
The Commission expressed concern over government encroachments in higher
education, particularly when standardization of practices and uniformity of
methods were being superimposed on the public higher education system.2 In
1959, the Eisenhower Committee report, The Efficiency of Freedom, documented numerous bureaucratic intrusions into the governance of higher education systems and concluded that state governmental controls threatened to
usurp the power of education policymaking. 3 Two reports on higher education
published in 1971 strongly endorsed the lay governing board concept of higher
education governance and opposed the imposition of uniform regulations on
state systems of higher education. Both reports reemphasized the need for independence among higher education institutions in order that institutions may
4
flexibly respond to the public's postsecondary education needs.
In 1973, the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education placed high
national priority on the maintenance of reasonable independence for institutions of higher education. 5 The Commission contended that public higher education is a function of society rather than of government, that colleges and universities perform most effectively and efficiently when control rests with the
university system, and that academic and administrative freedom is essential to
the future of higher education. After assessing the extent of encroachments by
state government offices and departments, the Commission concluded that independence from governmental interference in the operation of colleges and
universities is a priority issue in the 1970's.
The principal threat to the autonomy of the state higher education system
1.

CARNEGIE COMMISSION

ON HIGHER EDUCATION,

THE CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION 59

PRIORITIES FOR ACTION:

FINAL REPORT OF

(1973).

2. COMMISSION ON FINANCING HIGHER EDUCATION, NATURE AND NEEDS OF HIGHER EDUCATION
56 (1952).
3. THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT AND HIGHER EDUCATION, THE EFFICIENCY OF FREEDOM
7 (1959).
4. See ASSEMBLY ON UNIVERSITY GOALS AND GOVERNANCE, FIRST REPORT (1971); UNITED
STATES OFFICE OF EDUCATION TASK FORCE ON HIGHER EDUCATION, REPORT ON HIGHER EDUCATION

(1971).
5. See

CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION,

SIX PRIORITY PROBLEMS

(1973)

GOVERNANCE OF HIGHER EDUCATION:

[hereinafter cited as GOVERNANCE OF HIGHER EDUCATION].
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is bureaucratic intrusion that receives stimulus from delegations of power by
the legislature or the executive. A companion publication to the Eisenhower
Committee report, THE C111us AND TE STATE,6 cited examples of the debilitating effect of state administrative controls on the public and private sectors of
American higher education and underscored the need for safeguards to protect
the independence of the college and university.
However petty each instance of control may be, in cumulative effect
a broad range of restrictions upon the operating freedom of institutions
of higher education leaves very little room for imagination and vitality
by which truly creative institutions of higher learning are nourished.7
Reasonable independence from state government interference is predicated
on the historical tradition of autonomous colleges and universities and "on the
professional nature of many of the decisions that must be made, on the need to
elicit the devotion and sense of responsibility of the major groups internally
involved, [and] on the wisdom of drawing advice and support from interested
private citizens."" Legislative interference in the operations of higher education
is implied in the following analysis:
Legislatures, made up of varied personnel and subject to frequent and
violent changes in composition according to the fluctuating political
fortunes of parties and individuals, and convening for short and
crowded sessions . . ., cannot give the continuous study and wholehearted devotion which is requisite to the development of a wise educational policy for the state .... [F]ew if any members are likely to have
had any experience in the study of problems of higher educational administration, and many of them will possess but slight comprehension
or any sympathy with the aims and methods of academic and scientific
teaching and research. 9
Traditionally, the higher education governing board has been considered
the most appropriate entity for the development of higher education policy.
The rationale for placing broad powers exclusively in the hands of the higher
education governing board is that this body is likely to have the understanding
and experience that will permit wise judgment in dealing with matters of
educational policy. The governing board thus becomes the link between the
higher education system and society; it preserves reasonable autonomy for the
system and can adapt the system to meet changing social needs.
Detailed provisions of public law that authorize interference by executive
agencies diminish the authority of the governing board and encourage the
expansion of legislative and executive oversight. The need for a suitable
mechanism to insure reasonable autonomy on selected issues of public college
and university governance implies the need for a legal structure, supported by
the judiciary, that confers certain powers and duties on a higher education
6.
7.
8.
9.

M. Moos & F. E. RouRKE, THE CAMPUS AND THE STATE (1959).
Id. at 323.
J. J. CORSON, THE GOVERNANCE OF COLLEGES AND UNinERsrriEs 51 (1971).
E. C. ELLIOT & M. M. CHAMBERS, THE COLLEGES AND THE COURTS 509 (196).
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governing body that cannot be withdrawn or denied at the whim of another
branch or department of state government. A constitutional amendment elevating the state higher education system's governing board to autonomous constitutional status may provide such a mechanism.
ASSESSMENT OF A CONSTITUTIONALLY ESTABLISHED
GOVERNING BOARD

As A

MECHANISM FOR AUTONOMY

The constitutions of fourteen states appear to grant substantial power of
management and control to the state's higher education board or boards.1Ten states appear to vest unrestricted power over higher education governance
in the higher education governing board." Administrative arrangements for
the control of higher education among these ten states range from Michigan,
a state that provides for autonomous governing boards for each institution
within the state system, to Georgia, which has a single governing board ex2
ercising authority over higher education in the state.1
An assessment of the functional meaning to be ascribed to the legal concept
of constitutionally autonomous higher education must reconcile varying judicial interpretations of state constitutional provisions. This task is made
difficult by the fact that the wording of such provisions has not been uniform
among these fourteen states, and state courts have not applied a uniform
standard in interpreting them. Those education systems that appear to possess
constitutional autonomy may be restricted either by the precise terms of the
'provision granting constitutional status or by other provisions of the state constitution that limit or void a specific grant of autonomy. Finally, judicial notice
of a history of administrative and political practice may annul a constitutional
provision that on its face places the state's higher education system among
13
those judicially held to be constitutionally autonomous.
10. The fourteen states and their respective constitutional provisions are as follows:
Alabama, ALA. CONsT. art. XIV, §264 & amend. 161, §1; California, CAL. CONST. art. IX, §9;

Georgia, GA. CONST. art. VIII, §4, ch. 2-6701; Idaho, IDAHO CONsT. art. IX, §10; Louisiana, LA.
CONST. art. VIII, §6; Michigan, MICH. CONST. art. VIII, §§6-7; Minnesota, MINN. CONsT. art.
VIII, §4; Missouri, Mo. CONST. art. II, §5; Montana, MONT. CONST. art. X, §9; Nevada, NEv.
CONST. art XI, §6; North Dakota, N.D. CONST. art. 54; Oklahoma, OKLA. CONST. art. VI,
§31; art. XIII, §8; art. XIII-A, §2, art. XIII-B, §§1 & 2; South Dakota, S.D. CoNsT. art.
XIV, §3; Utah, UTAH CONST. art. X, §4.
11. These ten states are Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma, and Utah. See note 10 supra.
12. Arrayed between these two systems are states like Louisiana and Oklahoma, each of
which maintains institutional governing boards for major state colleges and universities and
a statewide coordinating board for all public higher education. In addition, the states of
California, Idaho, South Dakota and Nevada appear to grant substantial constitutional
autonomy to their respective higher education systems, despite constitutional language permitting limited legislative authority over higher education affairs. In California, the legislature
is empowered only to insure compliance with university endowment terms and oversee invest-

ment practices of the university regents. CAL. CONsT. art. IX, §9. Idaho's legislature may prescribe "regulations" relative to the university system. IDAHO CONsT. art. IX, §10. South Dakota's
legislature establishes "rules and regulations" for the operation of its state educational institutions. S.D. CONsT. art. XIV, §3. Nevada's legislative branch sets "duties" of the university
governing board. NEV. CONsT. art. XI, §4.
13. Where state courts have not recognized the autonomous constitutional status of the
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PowersImplied in Autonomous ConstitutionalStatus
Among those jurisdictions where constitutionally autonomous higher education has been judicially confirmed, courts have implied numerous specific
powers from the broad grant of authority delegated to the higher education
system by the constitution. The higher education governing board has been
held to have implied constitutional authority to exceed legislatively established
tuition rates 14 and campus parking fines.' 5 The authority of the board to set
additional health requirements for admission 6 or to establish residence standards for the exclusive purpose of fixing tuition has also been confirmed by the
courts.' 7 As against a city or municipality, there exists authority to support the
contention that an autonomous university system is exempt from taxes for
police and fire protection if no contract for such services existed.' 8 The supervisory power of the governing board and the board's control over funds of the
higher education system have been held to imply the board's exclusive right to
2 0
9
establish and maintain a university infirmary, construct dormitory buildings,
operate laundry and dry-cleaning facilities, 2' make voluntary payments to a
school district (in lieu of taxes),22 and to construct a postal facility and contract
for postal services. 23 Additionally, the management responsibilities of the constitutionally autonomous governing board are judicially acknowledged to inhigher education system, no assessment is possible. Alabama, North Dakota, and South Dakota
courts have permitted wide latitide to higher education governing boards where statutory and
constitutional powers have been complimentary. See Cox v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of
Ala., 161 Ala. 639, 49 So. 814 (1909); Zimmerman v. Minot State College, 198 N.W.2d 108 (N.D.
1972); State v. Dolan, 61 S.D. 530, 249 N.W. 923 (1933). However, the constitutional autonomy
of the higher education system in these states has not yet received judicial recognition. The
Missouri and Utah university systems do not possess constitutional autonomy despite constitutional language that appears to grant autonomous status. See Mo. CONST. art. 1U, §5;

UTAH CONSr. art. X, §4. Supreme court decisions in these two states emphasize that the respective public higher education systems have conformed to legislative enactments over a
period of more than 50 years without once raising the challenge of constitutional autonomy
as a basis for refusal to comply with a legislative act. See State v. Board of Curators, 268 Mo.
598, 188 S.W. 128 (1915); University of Utah v. Board of Examiners, 4 Utah 2d 408, 295 P.2d
348 (1956). The import of these decisions is that constitutional autonomy may be substantially
eroded, if not altogether lost, when the governing board acquiesces in unconstitutional higher
education legislation over an extended period of time.
14. Kowalski v. Board of Trustees of MaComb County Community College, 67 Mich. App.
74, 240 N.W.2d 272 (Ct. App. 1976).
15. Student Gov't Ass'n of La. State Univ. v. Board of Supervisors of La. State Univ., 262
La. 849, 264 So. 2d 916 (1972).
16. Wallace v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 75 Cal. App. 274, 242 P. 892 (Ct. App. 1925).
17. Schmidt v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 63 Mich. App. 54, 233 N.W.2d 855 (Ct.

App. 1975).
18. Lucking v. People, 320 Mich. 495, 31 N.W.2d 707 (1948).
19. Davie v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 66 Cal. App. 695, 227 P. 243 (Ct. App.
1924).
20. Fanning v. University of Minn., 183 Minn. 222, 236 N.W. 217 (1931).
21. Villyard v. Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 204 Ga. 517, 50 S.E.2d 313 (1948).
22. Sprik v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 43 Mich. App. 178, 204 N.W.2d 62 (Ct. App.
1972), aff'd, 390 Mich. 84, 210 N.W.2d 332 (1973).
23. Bauer v. State Bd. of Agriculture, 164 Mich. 415, 129 N.W. 713 (1911).
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clude exclusive power to appoint faculty, 24 establish and enforce standards of
conduct for students,25 conduct quasi-judicial hearings concerning matters of
student discipline and termination of personnel,26 and, in general, establish all
rules and regulations that the board considers necessary to promote the health,
27
welfare, morals and education of students.
LegislationRequiring Specific Acts of University System Management
Three state court decisions are illustrative of the general principle that if
the state constitution provides for autonomous higher education, legislation
directing specific acts of higher education management or academic policy
implementation may be either inapplicable to the higher education system or
unconstitutional. In these decisions the courts rejected statutes prescribing the
location of a college, changing the governance of a college, or placing restrictions on the employment of university employees.
The Michigan Constitution of 1963 established constitutionally autonomous
governing boards for each of the state higher education and post-secondary
education institutions.28 Each institutional governing board is a constitutional
body corporate having "general supervision of its institution and the control
29
and direction of all expenditures from the institution's funds."
The landmark decision recognizing the autonomy of the University of
Michigan governing board is Sterling v. Board of Regents of the University of
Michigan,30 in which a mandamus action was brought to compel the University of Michigan Regents to remove the homeopathic medicine college to
Detroit in compliance with legislative statute. In Sterling, the Michigan
supreme court examined the constitutional provision granting autonomy to
the University of Michigan and determined that the provision effectively made
the Regents the only body in which the constitution reposed general supervisory power in the absence of an express reservation of power to the legislature to control or define the Regents' duties. The court held that the legislature was without authority to enforce the removal of the homeopathic medicine
college because the constitution conferred exclusive management of the university upon the Regents.
The board of regents and the legislature derive their power from the
same supreme authority, namely, the constitution. In so far as the powers
24. Searle v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 23 Cal. App. 3d 448, 100 Cal. Rptr. 194 (Ct.
App. 1972).
25. Goldberg v. Regents of he Univ. of Cal., 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463 (Ct.
App. 1967).
26. Ishimatsu v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 266 Cal. App. 2d 854, 72 Cal. Rptr. 756 (Ct.
App. 1968).
27. Pyeatte v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 102 F. Supp. 407 (W.D. Okla. 1951),
aff'd, 342 U.S. 936 (1952).
28. The provisions granting autonomy are substantially the same as the provisions establishing the University of Michigan's autonomous status under MICH. CONST. art. VIII
(1850), §13 and MICH. CONST. art. XI, §5 (1908).
29.

MICH. CONsT. art. VIII, §5.

30. 110 Mich. 369, 68 NA.. 253 (1896).
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of each are defined by that instrument, limitations are imposed, and a
direct power conferred on one necessarily excludes its existence in the
other, in the absence of language showing a contrary intent .... They
are separate and distinct constitutional bodies with the powers of the
regents defined. By no rule of construction can it be held that either can
encroach upon or exercise the powers conferred upon the other.A1
The 1879 California constitution specified that "[t]he University of California shall constitute a public trust" its organization and government to be
perpetuated "by the organic act creating the same." 32 The California District
Court of Appeal found that the effect of perpetuating the organization and
government of the University of California in a manner consistent with the
organic act of its incorporation was to elevate the university "to the place and
33
dignity of a constitutional department of the body politic."
In People v. Kewen 34 the California supreme court considered the constitutionality of legislative enactments intended to change the governance of Hastings College of Law. Hastings had become affiliated with the University of
California System under legislative provisions enacted prior to the adoption of
the 1879 constitution. The court determined that the constitution required the
university to be perpetuated in the form and character of the laws existing at
the time of adoption of the constitution. Since the act affiliating Hastings with
the California University System was in existence at the adoption of the constitution, the court reasoned that Hastings' governance had been incorporated
by reference in the constitution. This reasoning forced the conclusion that the
legislature was not competent to change Hastings College government.
The Idaho constitution gave the Idaho Regents authority similar to that
granted in Michigan when it delegated "general supervision of the university,
and the control and direction of all the funds . . .under such regulations as
may be prescribed by law."3' 5 In addition, the Idaho Constitution contains a
clause similar to California's higher education amendment, incorporating by
reference all territorial powers of the regents in a provision perpetuating
"rights, immunities, franchises, and endowments" previously granted. 36
In Dreps v. Board of Regents of the University of Idaho37 the constitutional
provision granting autonomy to the Idaho Regents was construed. An employee
of the university sought to recover salary denied to her by the Idaho Regents
on the grounds that payment would violate the state's antinepotism statute.
The supreme court looked to the intention of the framers to determine the
meaning of "regulations as may be described by law" vis-a-vis the grant of
supervisory powers to the regents. In concluding that "regulations" referred
only to appropriations the legislature might make to the university, the court
held that "regulations" referred more "to the manner, method, procedural and
31. Id. at 382, 68 N.W. at 257.
32. CAL. CONsT. art. IX, §9.
33. Williams v. Wheeler, 23 Cal. App. 619, 622, 138 P. 937, 939 (Ct. App. 1913).
34. 69 Cal. 215, 10 P. 393 (1886).
35. IDAHO CoNsr. art IX, §10.
36. Id.
37. 65 Idaho 88, 139 P.2d 467 (1943).
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orderly conduct of business than to mandatory or prohibitive legislation." 38
The court concluded the legislature had no authority to restrict the Idaho
Regents in the manner of their employment of professors, officers, agents, or
employees; thus, the antinepotism statute had no application to the university.
Numerous other decisions have affirmed the proposition that legislation requiring specific acts of university system management are violative of autonomous status. Special legislation has been deemed an unconstitutional encroachment on the autonomous university governing board when it seeks to prescribe
the amount of federal funds to be used in support of a college department 39 or
to compel the board to appoint a professor. 40 Further, in the absence of express
statutory reference to the higher education system, courts have held general
legislation inapplicable to the autonomous university governing board when
the legislation required payroll deductions to be made by the state comptroller 41 or compelled contractor's bonds to be arranged for university building
construction. 42
Legislation TransferringPower From the University System
Numerous decisions outlining the powers of constitutionally autonomous
higher education systems have dealt with the relationship between the state
auditor or comptroller and the higher education governing board. For example,
in State v. Chase43 an action was brought to compel the state auditor to reimburse the university for the cost of a survey that preceded the installation of a
group life insurance plan at the university. The auditor's refusal to pay the
expense was based on a State Finance Commission ruling disapproving expenditures for the survey. The commission claimed authority to supervise and
control the expenditure of university funds under a Minnesota statute centralizing administrative responsibility in the governor. Minnesota's supreme
court concluded that the university constituted a constitutional corporation
that vested the Minnesota Regents with the exclusive power of university management. As in California, a constitutional clause perpetuating the territorial
acts creating the University of Minnesota was the basis for the court's conclusion. The court affirmed mandamus on the grounds that the Minnesota Regents
were constitutionally vested with exclusive power of university management.
An analogy between the Minnesota Regents and a private corporate entity was
drawn.
Of that corporation the regents were both the sole members and the
governing board. They were the corporation in which were perpetuated
the things covered by the constitutional confirmation. The language has
a definite legal import; the terms are those of confirmation in perpetuity
38. Id. at 96, 139 P.2d at 471.
39. State Bd. of Agriculture v. Fuller, 180 Mich. 349, 147 N.W. 529 (1914).
40.
41.
667, 73
42.
43.

People v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 18 Mich. 468 (1869).
California State Employees' Ass'n v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 267 Cal. App. 2d
Cal. Rptr. 449 (Ct. App. 1968).
Weinberg v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich.. 97 Mich. 246, 56 N.W. 608 (1893).
175 Minn. 259, 220 N.W. 951 (1928).
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of a prior grant of corporate rights. So the university, in respect to its
corporate status and government, was put beyond the power of the legisthe right to amend or repeal which exists in
lature by paramount law,
44
the people themselves.
A second example is Regents of the University of Michigan v. AuditorGeneral,4 5 in which Regents of the University of Michigan sought to compel
the Auditor-General to draw warrants on the State Treasurer in order that the
Regents might pay the travel expenditures of university representatives. The
Auditor-General contended that the general accounting laws of the state were
applicable to monies appropriated by the legislature for the use and maintenance of the university. The Michigan supreme court recognized the Regents
as "a constitutional corporation of independent authority, which, within the
scope of its functions, is co-ordinate with and equal to that of the Legislature." 46 Despite the acquiescence of the Regents in submitting warrants for the
Auditor-General's transmittal to the State Treasurer, the denial of the warrants
did not conform to the public policy developed over the half-century of autonomous higher education existent in Michigan. Consequently, the court held that
the state's general accounting laws did not apply to the expenditure of funds
under the exclusive control of the Regents and the duties of the AuditorGeneral were purely ministerial, permitting no discretion in complying with
47
decisions of the Regents.
Under many state government plans for centralization, the state auditor is
but one of many administrative agencies delegated the responsibility of supervising and controlling the university system. Two cases demonstrate the result
when such administrative agencies have sought to control expenditures authorized to the constitutionally autonomous university system.
In response to legislative enactments placing the fiscal affairs of the University of Idaho under the control of various state officers, the Idaho Regents
drafted a resolution denying the authority of the legislature to regulate the
university's operation. The resolution declared the independence of the Idaho
44. Id. at 265, 220 N.W. at 953.
45.

167 Mich. 444, 132 N.W. 1037 (1911).

46. Id. at 450, 132 N.W. at 1040.
47. An additional example is Trapp v. Cook Constr. Co., 24 Okla. 850, 105 P. 667 (1909),

a suit by Oklahoma A &M Regents seeking to compel the State Auditor to pay college construction vouchers. At issue in the case was the legislature's authority to delegate supervision
of college construction to the State Board of Public Affairs. The Oklahoma constitution of
1907 specified that the State Board of Agriculture would be the Board of Regents for the
agricultural and mechanical colleges and was constitutionally empowered with "such other
duties . .. as may be provided by law." OKLA. CONST. art. VI, §31 (1907). The Oklahoma
supreme court accepted the proposition that the term "other duties" was a constitutional
reference to the territorial statutes defining the duties and powers of the A & M Regents.
Reasoning that these territorial powers became fixed and vested upon adoption of the constitution, the court held that "additional duties may be required [of the A &M Regents], but
none vested by the Constitution may be taken away by the Legislature." 24 Okla. at 855, 105
P. at 669. The legislative enactment placing power to approve, supervise, and contract for all
state construction projects in the State Board of Public Affairs was deemed unconstitutional in
its application to the A & M Regents and the auditor was directed to pay the construction
vouchers approved by the A &M Regents.
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Regents from statutes requiring deposit of university funds with the State
Treasurer, approval of supply and equipment purchases by the State Public
Works Department, preaudit of university claims by the State Board of Examiners, and submission of legal actions to the State Attorney General. A
petition for writ of prohibition to prevent specific acts implementing the Idaho
Regents resolution was filed with the Idaho supreme court. In State v. State
Board of Education and Board of Regents of the University of Idaho48 the
court interpreted the language of Idaho Constitution, article 9, section 10,
giving particular scrutiny to the clause placing control and direction of all
university funds or appropriations in the Idaho Regents "under such regulations as may be prescribed by law."
The regulations which may be prescribed by law and which must be
observed by the regents in their supervision of the university, and the
control and direction of funds, refer to methods and rules for conduct of
business and accounting to authorized officers. Such regulations must not
be of a character to interfere essentially with the constitutional discretion of the board, under the authority granted by the constitution.49
In response to the contention that the State Board of Examiners was
authorized by statute and article 4, section 18 of the Idaho constitution to examine all claims against the state (including claims against the university and
the Idaho Regents), the court referred to precedent establishing that a claim
against the university was not a claim against the state. By strictly construing,
and therefore limiting, the application of the Board of Examiners powers, the
court sought to reconcile conflicting constitutional provisions in a manner
that would permit both to stand together. Excluding the Idaho Regents from
the application of the constitutional provision requiring examination of all
claims against the state permitted the court to sustain the Idaho Regents' constitutional power to control and direct university funds and appropriations.
In early 1924, a watershed decision dealing with the relationship between
the Regents of Michigan Agricultural and Mechanical College and the Michigan State Administrative Board [hereinafter "Administrative Board"] was
handed down by the Michigan supreme court. 50 The Michigan legislature had
appropriated money to the college but specifically designated to what purposes
the funds were to be applied and placed supervisory control in the state administrative board. The Board of Agriculture, acting as the Regents, sought to
compel the Administrative Board to grant the legislative appropriations without the supervisory strings attached. Taking cognizance of the history of the
legislature's support for Michigan higher education, the court reasoned that the
main purpose of the legislation was to provide financial support for the college
extension program, while the policy of placing supervisory control in the Administrative Board was deemed incidental to the main legislative purpose. In a
five to four decision the majority took the position that the legislative condi48. 33 Idaho 415, 196 P. 201 (1921).
49. Id. at 427, 196 P. at 254.
50. State Bd. of Agriculture v. State Administrative Bd., 226 Mich. 417, 197 N.W. 160

(1924).
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tion violated the constitutional powers of the Regents and could not be used
to deny control and management of the appropriation. The condition placing
supervisory control in the Administrative Board was declared unconstitutional,
but the appropriation to the college was allowed to stand. 51
LegislationRelating to State-wide Concerns
Courts have concluded that a matter is not exclusively a higher education
affair, but is of general statewide concern when statute and case law reflect a developed legal theory or a general social policy of the state. 2 In
cases dealing with the application of workmen's compensation, 3 public employee rights, 5 4 and public health standards s- it would appear that legislative
enactments on these subjects would have only an incidental impact on the governance of the higher education system and would not infringe on the constitutional autonomy of the Regents. Similar enactments, such as the fixing of a state
minimum wage law, would seem sufficiently broad in scope and social purpose
to apply to the autonomous higher education system. Fnally, the authority of
the legislature to establish the jurisdiction of state courts hearing cases in which
the Regents are a party would be unquestionable.5 6
DistinctionsBetween Appropriationsand Expenditures
The distinction between conditions the legislature may validly attach to
funds appropriated to the higher education system and conditions that consti51. As recently as 1975 the Michigan supreme court was asked to discriminate between
the powers of the governing boards of the universities and the State Board of Education. In
Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. State, 395 Mich. 52, 235 N.W.2d 1 (1975), the University of
Michigan Regents brought suit for declaratory relief, arguing that legislative acts conditioning
appropriations to the universities were unconstitutional. The Board of Education intervened
as a defendant in an attempt to establish that a constitutional provision requiring the State
Board of Educaion to "serve as the general planning and coordinating body for all public
education" was authority for requiring prior approval of all state university programs. See
MxcH. CoNsT. art. VIII, §3. The court abstained from deciding the constitutionality of the

conditional appropriation, but did define the authority of the State Board of Education in
the following terms: "It is our opinion that the Universities must inform the Board of proposed new programs and the estimated financial requirements for each .... We interpret
'approval' as meaning only advice to the legislature and to the universities. This advice relates
to the overall planning and coordinating function of the Board and in no way carries with it
the power to veto the proposed programs .... In other words, the Board is advisory in
nature." 395 Mich. at 75,235 N.W.2d at 11.
52. Presumably, application of the doctrines of sovereign immunity and eminent domain
would apply to the state university system on the ground that the independence of the
Regents, an instrumentality of the state devoted to a public purpose, is not threatened by
these doctrines. See Branum v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 5 Mich. App. 134, 145
N.W.2d 860 (Ct. App. 1966); Knapp v. State, 125 Minn. 194, 145 N.W. 967 (1914).
53. Peters v. Michigan State College, 320 Mich. 243, 30 N.W.2d 854 (1948).
54. Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Employment Relations Comm'n, 389 Mich. 96, 204
N.W.2d 218 (1973).
55. Wallace v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 75 Cal. App. 274, 242 P. 892 (Ct. App. 1925).
56. E.g. Glass v. Dudley Paper Co., 365 Mich. 227, 122 N.W.2d 489 (1962); Ishimatsu v.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. 266 Cal. App. 2d 854, 72 Cal. Rptr. 756 (Ct. App. 1968).
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tute unconstitutional interference with the autonomous governing board was
addressed in a Minnesota supreme court decision:
At one extreme, the Legislature has no power to make effective, in
the form of a law, a mere direction of academic policy or administration.
At the other extreme it has the undoubted right within reason to condition appropriations as it sees fit. 'In such case the regents may accept or
reject such appropriation ..... If they accept, the conditions are binding on them.' [citations omitted]5 7
Courts have adopted the general rule that a proper exercise of the legislative
appropriation power results when legislative conditions or procedures for
compliance with conditions do not infringe directly or indirectly on the essential constitutional powers granted the higher education governing board. 58
Conditions that the legislature can validly attach to appropriations include requirements that prescribed accounting practices be used, 59 that standardized reporting be implemented,eo and that grants for the maintenance of all departments in a university be effectuated. 61 Courts have also upheld legislative
conditions that allocated funds by line-item appropriation - or specified the
general purpose of a grantY3 On the other hand, courts have held invalid
conditions setting limitations on the amount of expenditures for a given department at a college,6 4 stipulating that a particular university program be
instituted at a given location,65 or providing a specific grant to a particular
institution in order to circumvent the board's authority to allocate funds.66
While the dispute over the subject and scope of legislative conditions that
may be validly attached to higher education appropriations has not been totally
resolved, the courts have come down squarely in support of autonomy with
respect to two discrete, but interdependent issues. First, the legislature is
deemed to have no authority to attach conditions to higher education funds
derived from sources other than legislative appropriation.67 The proceeds of
federal land grants, federal appropriations, and private donations to autonomous higher education systems may be required to be reported to the state, but
these proceeds are not subject to the legislature's power to condition appropria-

57. State v. Chase, 175 Minn. 259, 268, 220 N.W. 951, 955 (1928).
58. E.g. Board of Regents of Higher Educ. v. Judge, 168 Mont. 438, 543 P.2d 1323 (1975);
Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla. v. Childers, 197 Okla. 350, 170 P.2d 1018 (1946).
59. State v. State Bd. of Educ., 33 Idaho 415, 196 P. 201 (1921).
60. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. State, 395 Mich. 52, 235 N.W.2d 1 (1975).
61. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Auditor General, 167 Mich. 444, 132 N.V.
1037 (1911).
62. Board of Regents of Higher Educ. v. Judge, 168 Mont. 433, 543 P.2d 1323 (1975).
63. State Bd. of Agriculture v. State Administrative Bd., 226 Mich. 417, 197 N.W. 160
(1924).
64. State Bd. of Agriculture v. Fuller, 180 Mich. 349, 147 N.W. 529 (1914).
65. Sterling v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 110 Mich. 369, 68 N.W. 253 (1896).
66. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. v. Childers, 197 Okla. 350, 170 P.2d 1018
(1946).
67. State Bd. of Agriculture v. State Administrative Bd., 226 Mich. 417, 197 N.W. 160
(1924).
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tions. Second, legislative appropriations conditioned upon a preaudit or upon
supervisory control over higher education funds being reposed in a state administrative agency have been held unconstitutional.68 Legislative conditions
must be complied with when the governing board accepts the specific appropriations, but a requirement to insure compliance by transferring control of expenditures to another state governmental entity is violative of the board's
constitutional powers.0 9 In support of this position, courts reason that once an
appropriation is made the fund passes to the higher education governing board,
and becomes the property of the higher education system, to be expended
under the exclusive control and direction of the board.7 0
PROPOSED.AAMENDMENTS TO THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION

Departurefrom the Present- A Guarantee of Autonomy
The Florida Constitution of 1968 provides that "Adequate provision shall
be made by law ... for the establishment, maintenance and operation of institutions of higher learning and other public education programs that the
needs of the people may require."71 Constitutional power to make laws was
vested in the Florida Legislature; 72 hence, the legislature's authority to regulate
and prescribe the powers and duties of the higher education governing body is
without constitutional limitation.
Florida's State Board of Education is a constitutional body consisting of the
governor and his cabinet and is empowered to exercise "such supervision of the
system of public education as is provided by law."' 3 The State Board of Education is authorized to approve rules and regulations adopted by the governing
board for the State University System of Florida7 4 This authority has been
held to constitute veto power over rules and regulations of the higher education governing board so that these rules and regulations never become operative; however, the State Board of Education has no authority to initiate rules
or to repeal rules once the rule becomes operationally effective.75
Under Florida statutory law the Board of Regents of the State University
System of Florida [hereinafter "Regents"] is charged with the responsibility of
operating the Florida university system.1 The Regents are intended to serve as
a policymaking board which may adopt rules and regulations and supervise the
higher education system consistent with legislative enactments.7 7 The Regents'
68. E.g. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Auditor General, 167 Mich. 444, 132
N.W. 1037 (1911); State Bd. of Agriculture v. State Administrative Bd., 226 Mich 417, 197
N.W. 169 (1924); Trapp v. Cook Constr. Co., 24 Okla. 850, 105 P. 667 (1909).
69. Board of Regents of Higher Educ. v. Judge, 168 Mont. 433, 543 P.2d 1323 (1975).
70. See Weinberg v. Regents of Univ. of Mich., 97 Mich. 246, 56 N.W. 605 (1893).
71. FLA. CONsT. art. IX, §1.
72. Id., art. I1, §1.
73. Id. art. IX, §2.
74. FLA. STAT. §240.031(1) (1977).
75. Tallahassee Democrat, Inc. v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 314 So. 2d 1964 (Fla. 1st D.C.A.
1975).
76. See FLA. STAT. ch.240 (1977).
77. Id. §240.001(2) (1977).
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power to establish rules for the management of the university system has been
mandated by statute,7 8 and confirmed by case law.7 9
A constitutional amendment granting autonomy to the Regents represents
a method to insure that reasonable authority over the governance of the university system is secured to the governing board. Such an amendment might
80
take the following form:
Section 1. There shall be a single state university system comprised of
all public four-year, upper level, and graduate institutions of higher
learning.
Section 2. The state university system shall be governed by a board of
regents which shall have full responsibility and authority to operate,
regulate, manage and control the state university system.
Section 3. The board of regents of the state university system shall be
a body corporate composed of nine members appointed by the governor
and confirmed by the senate to over-lapping nine-year terms as provided
by law.
Legal Implicationsof Adoption
The wise exercise of constitutional autonomy by the Board of Regents of
the State University System of Florida requires an understanding of the dimensions of the constitutional grant. State supreme court confirmation of the constitutional autonomy of the higher education governing board is sine qua non
for perfection of actual constitutional status of the Board of Regents, according
to which the Regents would be subject to reasonable limitations despite the
unrestricted nature of the grant.
While delineation of the precise degree of autonomy available to Florida's
higher education system can only be resolved by Florida's courts, legal
precedents that have established the doctrine of constitutional autonomy in
78. Id. §240.042(2) (1977).
79. Cornwell v. University of Fla., 307 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1975).
80. Florida's Constitutional Revision Commission has proposed a constitutional amendment on public higher education which reads in part: "The board of regents shall operate,
regulate, control, and be fully responsible for the management of the state university system,
subject to the overall coordinative responsibilities of the state board of education and subject to general law, except on matters relating exclusively to the educational policy of the
state university system." Proposed FLA. CONST. art. IX, §7(b). The dual aspect of this amendment, which subjects the state university system to coordination by the state board of education and to the application of the general law, while excepting exclusively educational
policies of the state university system, leaves at issue the extent to which the Legislature or
the state board of education may control or interfere with the discretion of the regents in the
management of the state university system. The Commission's proposed amendment appears
to vest the board of regents with full power of management over exclusively university system
affairs. If this presumption is correct a provision subjecting the state university system to the
general law would not be inconsistent with the concept of autonomous constitutional status,
See notes 91-93 infra. Constitutional authority to coordinate the higher education governing
board, granted to a state board of education, has been addressed in Regents of the Univ. of
Mich. v. State, 395 Mich. 52, 235 N.W.2d 1 (1975). The decision in that case supports the
proposition that a state board of education's authority is advisory in matters relating to the
governance of a constitutionally autonomous higher education system. See note 51 supra.
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other jurisdictions could be relied upon to reduce the number of issues subject
to litigation. Courts in jurisdictions that have confirmed autonomy look to the
degree to which legislation interferes with the constitutional power of the governing board in relationship to the particular issue before the court.3 ° This
judicial policy eschews the establishment of guidelines for general application,
but the legal implications of adopting a constitutionally autonomous higher
education system may be assessed from an analysis of the wealth of precedent
available in jurisdictions that have recognized the autonomy of the respective
higher education system.
The practical legal effect of the provision granting constitutionally autonomous status would be to enlarge the powers of the Regents. The proposed constitutional provision would also constitute a limitation upon the powers of
Florida's legislature8' and would presumably be self-executing. 82 Florida's
legislature would exercise control through the powers of appropriation, postaudit, creation and assignment of other higher education institutions, and
implementation of the constitutional mandate to provide for the Regents'
nine-year over-lapping terms. Additionally, the Florida Senate would have
power to consent to the appointees of the governor. The Regents' basic corporate powers would inhere under the constitution,83 and no alteration or modification of those powers could be effectuated by statute.8 4 While the legislature
could prescribe additional duties, none of the powers or duties conferred under
the constitution could be taken from the Regents, 5 nor could the Regent's
power be transferred to another agency of the state.86
The purpose of the provision granting autonomy is to confer on the Regents
full power in the conduct of exclusively university system affairs. 8 7 In general,
the Regents may provide for the exercise of all powers connected with the
proper and efficient governance of the university system. However, the constitutional provision does not grant absolute power of self-government, and
limitations of both the state and federal constitutions would apply to the
Regents. It follows that the university system could neither abridge nor deny
any of the rights protected by constitutional guarantees.88 Nor could the legis81. E.g., Board of Regents of Higher Educ. v. Judge, 168 Mont. 433, 543 P.2d 1323 (1975);
Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. State, 395 Mich. 52, 235 N.W.2d 1 (1975); State v. State Bd.
of Educ., 33 Idaho 415, 196 P. 201 (1926).
82. See Peters v. Meeks, 163 So. 2d 753 (Fla. 1964); King v. Board of Regents of the Univ.
of Nev., 65 Nev. 533, 200 P.2d 221 (1948).
83. See Gray v. Bryant, 125 So. 2d 846 (Fla. 1960); Student Gov't Ass'n of La. State Univ.
v. Board of Supervisors of La. State Univ., 262 La. 849, 264 So. 2d 916 (1972).
84. See University of Alaska v. National Aircraft Leasing, Ltd., 536 P.2d 121 (Alas. 1975).
85. See King v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Nev., 65 Nev. 533, 200 P.2d 221 (1948).
86. See Trapp v. Cook Constr. Co., 24 Okla. 850, 105 P. 667 (1909).
87. See State v. State Bd. of Educ., 33 Idaho 415, 196 P. 201 (1921).
88. Institutional autonomy may be viewed as the delegation of exclusive authority over
specified matters to the higher education institution. In the view of the Carnegie Commission,
matters that should be exclusively determined by the higher education institution include the
power to assign funds to specific purposes; expend funds subject only to postaudit; determine
assignments, work loads, salaries, and promotion of university employees; select individual
faculty, administrators, and students; establish academic policies on grading, degree granting,
course offerings, and program development; and fix policies on academic freedom, growth
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lature delegate additional powers going beyond the constitutional authority of
the Regents. 89
Legislation on subjects pertinent to promotion of the general welfare
through enforcement of statewide standards for public health or safety via the
state's police power would apply to the Regents.90 Constitutional autonomy
does not support the presumption that the state surrender or relinquish legislative power to declare public policy of the state. Thus, a statute that effects a
university system affair only incidentally in the accomplishment of a statewide
concern would certainly apply to the higher education system.91 However, the
fact of state legislation on a particular subject would not necessarily deprive
the Regents of power over the subject of the enactment. The state legislature
and the Regents may have concurrent jurisdiction over the same subject matter
as it relates to the university system and, in the absence of conflict, both en-

92
actments could stand.

CONCLUSION

In Florida's higher education system institutional autonomy would not be
precisely the same as the concept of constitutional autonomy. Under the proposed constitutional amendment the State University System of Florida would
be composed of higher education institutions under a single autonomous governing board, the Board of Regents. It is clear, however, that constitutionally
autonomous status would have the legal affect of distinguishing those issues
that are of particular and exclusive concern to the higher education system by
granting independent power to the Board of Regents.
The purpose of elevating a state university to constitutional status was
articulated in an early decision confirming constitutional autonomy for higher
education institutions in the state of Minnesota. Minnesota's supreme court
determined that the purpose of the constitutional provision was:
to put the management of the greatest state educational institution beyond the dangers of vacilating policy, ill-formed or careless meddling
and partisan ambition that would be possible in the case of management
by either legislature or executive, chosen at frequent intervals and for
functions and because oF qualities and activities vastly different from
those which
qualify for the management of an institution of higher
93

education.

Ultimately, all constitutionally autonomous higher education systems are
subject to some degree of state government control. The importance of a legal
rate, and administration of research and service activities. GOVERNANCE OF HIGHER EDUCATION,

supra note 5, at 168-70.
89. See State v. Woodruff, 134 Fla. 437, 184 So. 81 (1938).
90. See California State Employment Ass'n v. Flournoy, 33 Cal. App. 3d 219, 108 Cal. Rptr.
251 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093 (1973).
91. See Tolman v. Underhill, 39 Cal. 2d 708, 249 P.2d 280 (1952).
92.

See Branum v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 5 Mich. App. 134, 145

N.W.2d 860 (Ct. App. 1966).
93. See In re Bacon, 240 Cal. App. 2d 34, 49 Cal. Rptr. 322 (Ct. App. 1966).
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structure that supports reasonable independence for the public higher educadon system is critical, but the quality of governance both for higher education
and for state government depends on the participation of people. The actual
autonomy of Florida's higher education system may owe a greater debt to the
leadership of concerned individuals than to constitutionally protected powers.
The line between the state's power and the higher education system's autonomy
will ultimately be resolved, not by judicial decisionmaking alone, but by responsible commitment to the goal of excellence in Florida's state university
system.
94.

State v. Chase, 175 Minn. 259, 274, 220 N.W. 951, 957 (1928).
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